CHAPTER 1
OFFENSES; GENERAL PROVISIONS
6-1-1: DEFINITIONS
6-1-2: COMPLICITY
6-1-3: LIMITATION FOR COMMENCING CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
6-1-4: CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR CORPORATE CONDUCT
6-1-5: CRIMINAL ATTEMPT
6-1-6 CONSPIRACY
6-1-7: MANDATORY PROTECTION ORDER AGAINST DEFENDANT
6-1-8: VIOLATION OF BAIL BOND CONDITIONS
6-1-1: DEFINITIONS: (1224 2001 2138 2365 2900 3070 3646) Definitions set forth in any Section of this Title apply whenever the same term is used in the same sense in another Section of this Title, unless the definition is specifically limited, or the context indicates it is inapplicable. The following words, terms and phrases, when used in this Title, shall have the following meaning, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise:
“Agent” shall mean any director, officer, or employee of a corporation, or any other person who is authorized to act on behalf of the corporation.
“Bodily Injury” shall mean physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical or mental condition.
“Criminal Negligence.” A person acts with criminal negligence when, through a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise, he fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that a result will occur or that a circumstance exists.
“Culpable Mental State” shall mean intentionally, or with intent, or knowingly, or willfully, or recklessly, as these terms are defined in this Section:
(1) “Intentionally” or “With Intent.” All offenses defined in this Code in which the mental culpability requirement is expressed as “intentionally” or “with intent” are declared to be specific intent offenses. A person acts “intentionally” or “with intent” when his conscious objective is to cause the specific result proscribed by the ordinance defining the offense. It is immaterial to the issue of specific intent whether or not the result actually occurred.
(2) “Knowingly” or “Willfully.” All offenses defined in this Code in which the mental culpability requirement is expressed as “knowingly” or “willfully” are declared to be general intent crimes. A person acts “knowingly” or “willfully” with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by the ordinance defining an offense when he is aware that his conduct is of such a nature or that such circumstances exists. A person acts “knowingly” or “willfully” with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is practically certain to cause the result.
(3) “Recklessly.” A person acts “recklessly” with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by an ordinance defining an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists.
“Deadly Weapon” shall mean any firearm, whether loaded or unloaded, knife, or other illegal weapon.
“Destructive Device” shall mean any material, substance or mechanism capable of being used, either by itself or in combination with any other substance, material or mechanism, to cause sudden and violent injury, damage, destruction or death.
“Firearm” shall mean any instrument or device used in the propulsion or discharge of shot, slugs, shells, cartridges, bullets or other harmful objects or projectiles by the action of gunpowder exploded or burned within it, or by the action of compressed air within it, or by the power or action of springs, and including what are commonly know as air rifles, air pistols and B-B guns.
“High Managerial Agent” shall mean an officer of a corporation or any other agent in a position of comparable authority with respect to the formulation of corporate policy or the supervision in a managerial capacity of subordinate employees.
“Knife” shall mean any dagger, dirk, knife or stiletto with a blade over three and one-half inches (3 1/2″) in length, or any other dangerous instrument capable of inflicting cutting, stabbing, or tearing wounds, but does not include a hunting or fishing knife carried for sport use. The issue that a knife is a hunting or fishing knife must be raised as an affirmative defense.
“Officer” shall mean any administrative officer of the City.
“Police Officer” shall mean a police officer in uniform or, if out of uniform, one who has identified himself as a police officer.
“Possession” shall mean physical possession of an item by the defendant or, if the defendant is not in physical possession of an item, means that the item was at least partially under the defendant’s dominion and control. “Possession” need not be exclusive, and an item may be possessed jointly by the defendant and one or more other persons without a showing that the defendant had actual physical possession of the item.
“Premises” shall mean real property, buildings and other improvements thereon.
“Property” is that of “another” or “one or more other persons” if anyone other than the defendant has a possessory or propriety interest therein.
“Protected Person” shall mean the person or persons identified in the mandatory protection order as the person or persons for whose benefit the mandatory protection order was issued.
“Protection Order” shall mean any order that prohibited the restrained person from contacting, harassing, injuring, intimidating, molesting, threatening, or touching any protected person, or from entering or remaining on premises, or from coming within a specified distance of a protected person or premises, or any other provision to protect the protected person from imminent danger to life or health, that is issued by a court of this State or a municipal court, and that is issued pursuant to Article 14 of Title 13, C.R.S., Sections 14-4-101 to 14-4-105, C.R.S., Section 14-10-107, C.R.S., Section 14-10-108, C.R.S., Section 18-1-1001, C.R.S., Section 19-2-707, C.R.S., Section 19-3-316, C.R.S., Section 19-4-111, or Rule 365 of the Colorado Rules of the County Court Civil Procedure, an order issues as part of the proceedings concerning a criminal municipal ordinance violation, or any other order of a court that prohibited a person from contacting, harassing, injuring, intimidating, molesting, threatening, or touching any person, or from entering or remaining on premises, or from coming within a specified distance of a protected person or premises. For purposes of Section 6-1-7, W.M.C., only, “mandatory protection order” includes any order that amends, modifies, supplements, or supersedes the initial mandatory protection order. “Mandatory protection order” also includes any restraining order entered prior to July 1, 2003, and any foreign protection order as defined in Section 18-6-803.8, C.R.S.
“Public Place” shall mean any street, alley, road, highway, sidewalk, parking lot, public or community building, public park, any private property open to the general public, and includes any vehicle in or on any of the above-described locations. Nothing in this definition shall be construed to effect any change to federal and state laws and precedents applicable to search and seizure.
“Registry” shall mean the computerized information system created in Section 18-6-803.7, C.R.S., or the National Crime Information Center created pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 534.
“Restrained Person” shall mean the person identified in the order as the person prohibited from doing the specified act or acts.
6-1-2: COMPLICITY: (1224 2001) A person is legally accountable as principal for the behavior of another constituting an offense if, with the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of the offense, he aids, abets or advises the other person in planning or committing the offense.
6-1-3: LIMITATION FOR COMMENCING CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS: (1224)
(A) No person shall be prosecuted, tried or punished for any offense under this Title unless the complaint or action for the same is instituted within eighteen (18) months after the alleged commission of the offense.
(B) The time limitations imposed by subsection (A) of this Section shall be tolled if the offender is absent from the City, and the duration of such absence, not to exceed one (1) year, shall be excluded from the computation of the time within which any complaint or action must otherwise be filed.
(C) The period within which a prosecution must be commenced does not include any period in which a prosecution is pending against the defendant for the same conduct, even if the complaint or action that commences the prosecution is quashed or the proceedings thereon are set aside or are reversed on appeal.
(D) When an offense is based on a series of acts performed at different times, the period of limitation prescribed by this Code starts at the time when the last act is committed.
6-1-4: CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR CORPORATE CONDUCT: (1400 2001 3646)
(A) An individual is criminally liable for conduct constituting a violation of this Code that he performs or causes to occur in the name of or on behalf of a corporation to the same extent as if that conduct were performed or caused by him in his own name or behalf.
(B) A corporation is guilty of an offense if:
(1) the conduct constituting the offense consists of an omission to discharge a specific duty of affirmative performance imposed on corporations by the provisions of this Code; or
(2) the conduct constituting the offense is engaged in, authorized, solicited, requested, commanded, or knowingly tolerated by the board of directors, or by a high managerial agent acting within the scope of his employment or on behalf of the corporation.
6-1-5: CRIMINAL ATTEMPT: (1820 2001)
(A) A person commits criminal attempt if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for commission of an offense, he engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward the commission of the offense. A substantial step is any conduct, whether act, omission, or possession, that is strongly corroborative of the firmness of the actor's purpose to complete the commission of the offense. Factual or legal impossibility of committing the offense is not a defense if the offense could have been committed had the attendant circumstances been as the actor believed them to be, nor is it a defense that the crime attempted was actually perpetrated by the accused.
(B) A person who engages in conduct intending to aid another to commit an offense commits criminal attempt if the conduct would establish his complicity under Section 6-1-2, W.M.C., were the offense committed by the other person, even if the other is not guilty of committing or attempting the offense.
(C) It is an affirmative defense to a charge under this Section that the defendant abandoned his effort to commit the crime or otherwise prevented its commission, under circumstances manifesting the complete and voluntary renunciation of his criminal intent.
(D) Criminal attempt is a criminal offense, punishable by up to ninety (90) days imprisonment and a fine of up to four hundred fifty dollars ($450) or both, as provided in Section 1-8-1, W.M.C.
(A) It shall be unlawful for any person to commit conspiracy. A person commits conspiracy to commit an offense if, with the intent to promote or facilitate its commission, he agrees with another person or persons that they, or one (1) or more of them, will engage in conduct that constitutes an offense or an attempt to commit an offense, or he agrees to aid the other person or persons in the planning or commission of an offense or of an attempt to commit such offense.
(B) No person may be convicted of conspiracy to commit an offense, unless an overt act in pursuance of that conspiracy is proved to have been done by him or by a person with whom he conspired.
(C) If a person knows that one with whom he conspires to commit an offense has conspired with another person or persons to commit the same offense, he is guilty of conspiring to commit an offense with the other person or persons, whether or not he knows their identity.
(D) If a person conspires to commit a number of offenses, he is guilty of only one (1) conspiracy so long as such multiple crimes are part of a single criminal episode.
(E) Conspiracy is a criminal offense, punishable by up to ninety (90) days imprisonment and a fine of up to four hundred fifty dollars ($450) or both, as provided in Section 1-8-1, W.M.C.
6-1-7: MANDATORY PROTECTION ORDER AGAINST DEFENDANT: (1998 3057 3646)
(A) Pursuant to Section 18-1-1001, C.R.S., the Municipal Court shall issue a mandatory protection order against any person charged with a violation of any of the provisions of this Title, which order shall remain in effect from the time that the person is advised of his rights at arraignment or the person's first appearance before the Court and informed of such order until final disposition of the action or until further order of the Court. Such order shall restrain the person charged from harassing, molesting, intimidating, retaliating against, or tampering with any witness to or victim of the acts charged.
(B) At the time of arraignment or the person's first appearance before the Court, the Court shall inform the defendant of the mandatory protection order effective pursuant to this Section and shall inform the defendant that a violation of such order is punishable by contempt or by fine or imprisonment as provided by this Section.
(C) The Court is authorized to order any further appropriate restraint on the conduct of the defendant or to continue, dismiss or modify any existing mandatory protection order.
(D) It shall be unlawful for any person to violate a mandatory protection order. Violation of a mandatory protection order is a criminal offense, punishable by a fine or imprisonment, or both, as provided in Section 1-8-1, W.M.C.
(E) A person commits the crime of violation of a mandatory protection order if such person contacts, harasses, injures, intimidates, molests, threatens, or touches any protected person or enters or remains on premises or comes within a specified distance of a protected person or premises or violates any other provision of a mandatory protection order to protect the protected person from imminent danger to life or health, and such conduct is prohibited by a mandatory protection order, after such person has been personally served with any such order or otherwise has acquired from the court actual knowledge of the contents of any such order.
(F) Any sentence imposed pursuant to subsection (D) of this Section shall run consecutively and not concurrently with any sentence imposed for any crime that gave rise to the issuing of the mandatory protection order.
(G) Whenever a protection order is issued, the protected person shall be provided with a copy of such order. A peace officer shall use every reasonable means to enforce a protection order.
(H) Nothing in this Section shall be construed to alter or diminish the inherent authority of the Court to enforce its orders through civil or criminal contempt proceedings.
(I) No person charged with violation of a mandatory protection order pursuant to this Section shall be permitted, in the criminal action resulting from such charge, to collaterally attack the validity of the order that such person is accused of violating.
6-1-8: VIOLATION OF BAIL BOND CONDITIONS: (2919)
(A) It shall be unlawful for any person released on bail bond of whatever kind to knowingly fail to appear for trial or other proceedings in the case in which the bond was filed or to knowingly violate any condition of the bail bond.
(B) PENALTY: Any violation of this Section shall be deemed a criminal violation of this Code, punishable by a fine or imprisonment or both, in accordance with the provisions of Section 1-8-1, W.M.C.